In some environments, a player only learns the choice of another player if he or she undertakes a risky choice. While costless preplay communication (cheap talk) has been found to be effective in experimental coordination games, participants have typically learned both own payoffs and the other player's action. Are both of these components necessary for cheap talk to be effective? In our 2 Â 2 stag hunt game, the safe choice always yields the same payoff, so that information about payoffs does not always identify the other player's action. We vary whether information is provided about the other person's play, and whether costless one-way messages can be sent before action choices are made. We find that information provision about the other person's play increases coordination when there are messages, but otherwise has no effect. D 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Introduction
In many social and economic situations, actors must coordinate choices to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Often, there are multiple equilibria and the selection process reflects the tension between payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . Previous experimental work on twoperson coordination games (e.g., Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000) shows that cheap talk is typically effective in those games.
2 Because many economic interactions feature nonbinding messages, this issue has considerable importance for efficiency and social welfare.
An aspect that has been largely unexplored is the amount of information that must be conveyed for cheap talk to be effective. Usually, experimental studies give participants feedback about the outcomes as well as actions chosen (generally an inevitable byproduct of the payoff calibration). However, in some environments, costless signals are possible and outcomes are observable, but one cannot necessarily identify individual actions. This applies to any situation in which one can choose a risky but potentially profitable action, but only learns what the other party does if one actually chooses the risky action. 3 An example might be a project that can be undertaken by two agents to potential mutual benefits. Both agents can exert either high or low effort, without being directly observed, and high effort is more costly than low effort. For each individual, a sure return can be obtained by engaging in low effort. The project will pay out additional money if and only if both parties engage fully in the project (choose high effort). Thus, a party that chooses high effort will always be aware of the other party's action, but a shirking party will not know what the other party did without other explicit information.
We model this uncertainty in the framework of a nongeneric stag hunt game adapted from Cooper et al. (1992) .
While the (B,B) outcome is preferred by both players, it is risky for either person to play B, because this is a best response if and only if the probability that the other player chooses B is at least 7/9. If one plays B, the outcome reveals the other player's action. However, notice that a person who plays A always receives 80, and so will not be able to deduce the other player's action from the observed outcome alone. Cooper et al. (1992) tell each player both the outcome and the other player's action. We concentrate on the ex post ambiguity about the other player's action when one plays A. Our 2 Â 2 experimental design varies whether messages about intended play are permitted and whether a participant is told which action the other person has chosen. Thus, our study investigates the effect of combining cheap talk with information about actions.
Regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) offers one explanation for why information about actions can affect behavior in a one-shot setting. However, it does not address the effect of combining cheap talk with information about actions. Regret theory incorporates the idea that individuals might derive psychological pleasure (rejoice) from having made a good decision (after observing the state of the world), or derive psychological pain (regret) in a situation from having made a bad choice. The anticipation of regret and rejoice could lead to different choices according to whether information is provided about one's counterpart's choice. When no such information is provided, the utility of a player choosing A is simply 80. 4 However, when this information is provided, this person's modified utility depends on whether the counterpart played A or B. A player choosing A knows that when the counterpart has chosen A, he will rejoice from gaining 80 instead of 10 (if the player himself had chosen B).
However, he also knows that he will regret foregoing 20 (receiving 80 instead of 100) if it turns out that the other played B. A player in the full-information condition must take both psychological reactions into account when deliberating over a choice of A and B, and the choice might well differ across information conditions.
Allowing for preplay communication adds another dimension to why information about the other person's play might affect behavior. The additional information could decrease cheating (sending a B signal but playing A) by increasing the probability of being caught. Notice that a sender considering cheating is certain of being caught in the full-information condition, but faces a (weakly) lower probability of being caught otherwise, because only players who are choosing B will notice the cheating behavior. Assuming that players care about being caught cheating and tend to dislike it, behavior in the signal conditions might therefore be affected by whether information about the other person's play is provided or not.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design, results are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
Experimental design
Our experimental design follows Charness (2000) . The 144 participants were undergraduates majoring in either economics or humanities at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Average earnings were about 1400 pesetas (then about $9), including a 500 peseta show-up fee. Sessions lasted about 80 min.
In each session, there were 12 people seated at individual carrels. Instructions were given to each person and were also read aloud to the group. 5 There were 10 periods of play; participants were told that there would be random rematching in each period, and that the role of the signaler was also randomly drawn for the period. 6 In our four treatments, we used the stag hunt game of Fig. 1 , with 1 unit = 1 peseta. We varied only whether sending a costless signal was permitted, and whether we reported the other player's action before decision sheets were returned to the players.
Prior to each period in the Signal treatments, every participant was given a piece of paper. Senders received a paper that read ''I intend to play [A or B] .'' For receivers, the initial paper received was 5 Instructions can be found in our working paper version (Charness and Grosskopf, 2002) . 6 While we used random matching, it was only within subgroups of six players. This separation by sextuples enables us to have two completely independent observations for each session of 12 participants. Outcomes, aggregated over all rounds.
blank. Identical black pens were provided to each person to indicate a signal. In this way, no one knew which people were signalers in a period. After signal sheets were marked, these were collected and sorted; signals were distributed to the assigned receivers and senders received blank pieces of paper. At this point, players marked play choices on decision forms and these were collected. Payoffs were determined and marked (along with actions, if appropriate) on the forms, which were then returned to the participants. Payoffs were accumulated over the 10 periods, and people were paid individually and privately at the end of each session. We used the 2x2 treatment design shown in Fig. 2 . Table 1 We can analyze the data from the individual sextuples for a conservative statistical test of the difference between treatments, using either BB outcomes or B play. There are six sextuples in each treatment. The robust rank order test finds these two treatments to be statistically different at p = 0.01 (one-tailed tests) for both BB outcomes and B play. 7 This difference is comprised of three elements. First, there are 11% fewer B signals in the SNI treatment (136 instead of 156). In addition, B signals in the SNI treatment are treated as being less credible. The likelihood that the receiver of a B signal responds by playing B is 93% in the SI treatment (145 out of 156), but only 69% in the SNI treatment (94 out of 136). And finally, the smaller amount of credibility in the SNI is justified. We observe more ''cheating'' (sending a B signal but playing A) in the SNI treatment (11 out of 136, 8.09%) than in the SI treatment (3 out of 156, 1.92%).
Results
The results in the No Signal treatments are quite different from the Signal results (see Table 2 ). There For the nonparametric tests used in this study, see Siegel and Castellan (1988) . significantly different at p < 0.01. Regardless of whether information about actions is provided, B play and BB outcomes are more frequent in any Signal treatment. The trend with signals is toward increasing B play, whereas the trend without signals is toward decreasing B play (with some last period effects). While we do not observe equilibrium behavior in either case, Fig. 3 suggests that we are moving toward different equilibria.
In order to quantify the visual trend, we run robust probit regressions where we regress the chosen play on the information condition, the time trend, and an information-time interaction term. 9 For the Signal treatments, we do not find any coefficient significantly different from zero, although they all have the anticipated positive sign. We find that the probability of playing B decreases by 3% per round in the No Signal data. This is significantly different from zero at p < 0.01. The other coefficients are negative, but not significantly so.
In lieu of a full learning analysis, we examine round-to-round patterns. The No Signal treatments offer a fairly clean test of how transition (switching from A to B or vice versa) is affected by information about actions. It turns out that while aggregate behavior does not differ much across the No Signal treatments, round-to-round behavior is influenced on an individual level by foregone payoffs (payoff to the other, not selected choice). 
Conclusion
Coordinating on a risky, but Pareto-superior, outcome can be difficult. Past experimental studies have found that cheap talk can be effective in coordination games, but have not explored whether it is necessary to specifically provide information about the actions taken by all players that lead to one's revealed payoff. We use a nongeneric version of the stag hunt game that allows us to isolate this factor.
As expected, preplay communication facilitates coordination. More importantly, we find that the mere knowledge that one will be informed about the other player's action substantially enhances coordination when there is also a signal about intended play. It does not seem to have an effect in the absence of 8 In general, individual receiver behavior confirms the patterns observed in the aggregate. 10 For the full sequential analysis, see our working paper version (Charness and Grosskopf, 2002) . 9 Regression details and results can be found in our longer working paper version (Charness and Grosskopf, 2002). preplay communication, where it seems that B play is perceived to be too risky, regardless of whether one is informed about the counterpart's play.
In a repeated one-shot setting, regret theory could potentially predict differences across information treatments when there is no cheap talk. However, it offers no explanation for differences between the signal treatments. The observed difference in behavior can therefore be attributed to the effect information about actions has on the truthfulness and perceived credibility of a signal. The secondorder effect this information provision has on the signal receivers is especially pronounced. They are much more likely to respond with a B choice to a B signal if information about the action of the other is provided (93% versus 69%). It seems as if the information provision drastically increases the perceived credibility of the signal sender, although the sender's behavior only changes slightly (8% versus 2% of B senders cheat and play A).
Perhaps a receiver deliberating over A or B feels more secure in playing B knowing that, even if the sender defects and actually plays A, he will be informed about the B play of the receiver and the sender might then potentially feel bad about his deceptive behavior. If receivers expect that senders will feel unhappy about being caught cheating, even by receivers who did not trust them, the ''guilt aversion'' described in Charness and Dufwenberg (2002) offers a theoretical basis for our result. This is particularly true if a B signal combined with the sender subsequently playing A is perceived to be a violated ''promise''. 11 It is true that in both information conditions, a receiver who plays B after having received a B signal will find out whether the sender cheated or not. Given that in the INFO treatment both ''types'' of receivers find out whether a sender has cheated, the overall probability of being caught has increased (to 100%) which might explain the lower cheating rates. If receivers anticipate less cheating, we would expect a B signal to be perceived to be more credible.
Our study shows that the provision of information about actions is a factor that interacts with cheap talk, in a game in which only players who choose the risky action learn about their counterpart's choice in the previous period. This issue comes into play in experimental design, whenever a safe play or outside option leads to the same own payoff regardless of the actions of others. People may behave differently, depending on whether specific information about actions is conveyed. In coordination 11 In fact, our result suggests that informing the principal about the agent's action (rather than just the stochastic outcome) would have enhanced the effectiveness of promises in sustaining cooperation in that study. problems in the field, perhaps it is worth ensuring that all parties know that all parties will learn choices in all cases.
